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Abstract
Platoon formation is a freight organization system
where a group of vehicles follows a predefined trajectory
maintaining a desired spatial pattern. Benefits of
platooning include fuel savings, reduction of carbon
dioxide emissions, and efficient allocation of road
capacity. While traditionally platooning has been an
exclusive option limited to specific geographical areas
managed by a single operator, recent technological
developments and EU initiatives are directed at the
creation of an international, federated market for
platooning, i.e., a consortium of platoon operators that
collaborate and coordinate their users to constitute
freights covering international routes. In this paper,
we look at federated platooning from an insiders’
perspective. In our development, first we outline
the basic elements of platooning and federation of
platooning operators. Then, we provide a comprehensive
analysis to identify the possible insiders (employees,
users, operators, and federated members) and the
threats they pose. Finally, we propose two layered,
composable technical solutions to mitigate those threats:
a) a decentralized overlay network that regulates the
interactions among the stakeholders, useful to mitigate
issues linked to data safety and trustworthiness and b)
a dynamic federation platform, needed to monitor and
interrupt deviant behaviors of federated members.
1. Introduction
Platoon formation has been the subject of design
and analysis since seminal works on control law of
the late 1960’s [1], to high-profile studies, projects,
and initiatives of the 1990’s and 2000’s [2, 3]. At
the essence of automatic platoon formation there is
formation control [4, 5], where a group of either manned
or autonomous vehicles follows a predefined trajectory
while maintaining a desired spatial pattern. With respect
to conventional systems, the advantages of moving in
formation include system optimization (like fuel saving,
polluting emissions reduction, as well as efficient road
usage [6]) and enhanced road safety, thanks to the
respect of normed movements among vehicles (e.g.,
vehicle-to-vehicle distances, planned overtakes, etc.).
The recent surge in mass-produced autonomous ground
vehicles (both for the consumer and heavy-duty markets)
has provided an additional stimulus to the development
of advanced adaptive cruise control systems [7, 8].
This growing interest is also testified by the recent
investments in the EU Roadmap for Truck Platooning1
by the European Automobile Manufacturers Association,
delineating the necessary steps to implement multi-brand
platooning before 2025.
Indeed, while platooning is an effective solution
suited in principle for nation-to-continent-wide
applications, its most common implementations view
platooning as a narrow-field option limited to specific
categories (or brands) of vehicles, and confined to
specific pertinence areas. These restrictions are
mainly linked to the physical limitations of platooning
operators, that are either allowed to operate within
well-defined geographical boundaries, or require some
specific infrastructural hardware for coordination
(e.g., sensors, cameras, transmitters, etc.) of their
services. Recently, new business models and support
platforms have been proposed [9, 10, 11, 12] to share
and market transport services owned by disparate
transport operators. According to this new interpretation,
transport operators can overcome previous limitations
imposed by the topology of their pertinence areas
through federations [13]. A federated operator can
then buy transport services of other operators and offer
these, along with its own, to its users, which perceive
traveling as provided by a single operator. Adopting
this view, also platooning can become a commodity
where different operators, each with its own pertinence
areas, can federate, collaborate, and coordinate their
users to constitute freights covering international routes.
However, while federation can maximize the benefits of
platooning, its members increase their attack surface
1https://tinyurl.com/acea-platooning
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Figure 1. Examples of platoon formations in the
federated scenario.
exposed to insiders within the federation. To understand
this phenomenon and its implications over information
systems and cyber-physical ones, this paper focuses on
an analysis of the sensitive—yet elusive and frequently
overlooked—issue of insider threats. In detail, in § 2
we introduce platooning and federation of platooning
operators. Then in § 3 we identify the possible insiders
and the threats they pose. Finally, we propose two
composable solutions to mitigate the identified threats:
a) a decentralized overlay network, described in § 4.1,
that regulates the interactions among the stakeholders,
useful to mitigate issues linked to data safety and
trustworthiness and b) a centralized solution to monitor
and interrupt deviant behaviors of federated members,
presented in § 4.2, enabling the operation of a dynamic
federation platform. To conclude, in § 5 we discuss
related work from the general perspective of platooning
and with respect to the proposed solutions and in § 6 we
summarize results, limitations, and future developments
of our work.
2. Federated Platooning
Here we describe the main concepts of traditional and
federated platooning, as well as the elements needed to
understand the security analysis presented in § 3.
To illustrate the main concepts and dynamics of
platoon formation and federated platooning, we depict in
Figure 1 a schematic representation of possible scenarios.
The most common reason found in literature to
advocate platoon formation is to organize trucks that
travel the same route in a row, so that the trail created by
the first truck is used to reduce the fuel consumption of
the trucks that follow the queue [14], but many other local
or global efficiency parameters can be taken into account.
For the sake of simplicity, in the examples that follow we
abstract from the parameters (fuel consumption, polluting
emissions, road capacity) that each platoon operator
wants to optimize; we assume that platooning operators
can reach a mediated agreement, and rather focus on
describing their interactions in platoon formation. For
starter, let us concentrate on the convoy pointed by label
A©: it is an example of the simplest, traditional case of a
platooning service, capturing the basic occurrence in the
literature, in which users of the same platooning operator
are coordinated by its central authority (PO1).
The scenario pointed by label B© represents federated
platooning: vehicles in the convoy are users of different
operators (PO1 and PO2) and some of these (marked
in orange) are outside the pertinence area of their
operator. In this case, PO1 and PO2 coordinated
the formation of a mixed convoy. In B©, PO1 and
PO2 negotiated business policies for service usage to
mediate possibly conflicting formation-control logics
they deployed inside their networks. To better understand
this concept, let us suppose that the two operators
consider, in their respective platoon formation algorithms,
the two constraints of cruise speed and fuel consumption.
Although they account for the same parameters, PO1
could offer to its users solutions that maximize cruise
speed while PO2 could favor fuel savings. However,
thanks to agreed business policies in the federation,
they may reach a distributed consensus over a mediated
solution, satisfying the threshold parameters of their
convoy formation algorithms. To draw a parallel, such a
negotiation is similar to the one traditionally conducted
among mobile phone operators to allow their users to
roam within their networks.
Moreover, while traditional platoon formation relies
on a static plan where vehicles join and leave a formation
at predetermined times, the federation of platooning
operators allows for a higher degree of flexibility:
platooning users can decide to switch among different
convoys participated by users of other operators. This last
scenario is exemplified by the vehicle leaving the column
in B© to join the convoy in C©. The column pointed by
label C©, composed of the two users of operator PO3, is
outside the pertinence area of their home operator. Also
in this case, although the column is composed only of
vehicles of the same operator, the platooning plan results
from a negotiation between operator PO3, provider of the
vehicles and PO1 controller of the traveling area. Finally,
thanks to the collaboration between all operators, the
three vehicles 1©, 2©, and 3© can join the preformed
convoy in C©.
In such a landscape, clearing functionalities must
be made available to operators willing to collaborate.
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Clearing is a founding concept in federated scenarios
where self-interested parties share resources from
different administrative domains [15]. The concept
is drawn from finance, where “clearing of payments”
denotes all the activities needed to turn a promise of
payment into an actual movement of money from one
account to another. In the context of platooning, clearing
services are needed to correctly take into account the
many factors that constitute costs for vehicle owners,
and that need to be balanced with respect to the actual
movements in a formation: for example, the first member
of a platoon consumes more fuel than the rest of the
convoy, vehicles joining/leaving platoons at different
times undergo different cost schemes, etc. Moreover,
since optimal platooning assumes its members to fulfill
some pre-settled promises such as following planned
routes and keeping intra-vehicle distances, one important
factor for a reliable clearing system is risk management
with respect to users reputation, e.g., their average degree
of deviation from an agreed platooning plan. Clearing
services are also useful to allow users to directly evaluate
the actual gains (possibly expressed directly as monetary
transactions) of many configurations, e.g., whether to
join the tail of a formation or become the head of it,
or switching between columns. This aspect holds also
for users already in formation, which can agree to let
other users join their formation and share the costs of
the convoy. Beside direct user interaction, clearing costs
and the related policies can be also part of the logic of
composition among operators to select/propose optimal
plans to their users. For example, with reference to
the classical application to fuel savings, a federated
platooning clearing system can be used in two distinct
moments: i) prior to convoy formation, to calculate the
effectiveness of joining positions according to different
metrics such as the overall efficiency optimization or
fairness maximization; ii) during convoy operation, to
calculate how much each truck has gained or lost, in
terms of fuel consumption by following others or opening
the line, and to redistribute the profits on the basis of the
actual routes and trips.
3. Threats and Mitigations
Once the main elements of platooning and federated
platoon formation have been defined, it is possible
to analyze the security concerns of such a global
collaboration. These span from the illicit acquisition
of sensitive data of users to the deployment of malicious
platooning plans, which could result in a variety of
consequences, ranging from inflicting economic losses
to competitors, to affecting traffic over extensive areas,
and even to threatening the safety of roads.
A federated environment natively foresees sharing
one’s own sensitive information, and access to others’
information in a controlled way, for example to know
basic data such as the kind of vehicles on the road, the
most common routing choices, but in some cases also
enough details to make tracking a vehicle or a driver
possible. This kind of sharing is the core enabler for
the desired aggregation services. Consequently, security
concerns are greatly expanded as the attack surface is
enlarged and diversified with respect to a closed-world
model of operation. This kind of threats are not entirely
specific of such platooning federated platforms; they
would appear as an intrinsic aspect of any approach to
coordinate services of independent transport agencies.
Thus, they are interesting to address because results can
be applied to a wider set of scenarios, and at the same
time the analysis can be built upon previous works. For
example, in [16] Callegati et al. show how the members
of a public transportation consortium can exploit its
clearing system to infer strategic private information.
In the remainder, we show how these kinds of
attacks are relevant in a federated freight scenario: we
describe the main issues introduced by platooning and
evaluate their effects from an economic point of view,
showing practical abuse cases, and highlighting the
key vulnerabilities. In § 4 we present two, layered,
composable technical solutions to mitigate the identified
threats.
3.1. Concerns
The possible security problems of any platform
based on controlled sharing of sensitive data are
manifold and include threats such as: compromising
the infrastructure where data is stored with the aim of
subtracting it, intercepting data in transit by exploiting
unsafe communication protocols, injecting falsified or
malicious data by exploiting authentication weaknesses,
and many others; these types of attack are not specific
to our case study, but instead they are mainly related
to the correct design and implementation of a data
management infrastructure, a topic already widely
covered in literature [17, 18, 19, 20], and for this reason
they will not be discussed in this work.
Additionally, a complete threat analysis should
include all the different agents operating against the
system from the outside or within its boundaries, but
the purpose of this work is to focus on the attacks that
can come from an insider agent. The problem is not only
the lack of proper countermeasures but also the difficulty
of identifying a malicious insider in the first place [21].
Experts [22] agree that the strong contextual variance
of threats makes providing a general yet precise
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identification of all possible insiders difficult. Besides
the members of the federation (here, the platooning
operators), federated contexts contain two additional
broad categories of insiders: i) legitimate users, which
could leverage access to service providers and make a
malicious use of information extracted from services or
cause over-usages that entail unforeseen costs or outages;
ii) orchestrating agents, which are needed to coordinate
any complex architecture, can act as men-in-the-middle,
accessing and/or leaking private information, as well as
counterfeiting, throttling, hijacking or selecting data of
legitimate users.
Hereinafter, we follow a categorization between
privacy leakage attacks, where there is a theft of sensitive
information, and disruption attacks, where an attacker
interferes with the behavior or the structure of the system.
We decided to focus only on these two categories of
concerns for several reasons. First, we must remember
that we are analyzing the concerns from an insider threat
point of view. For this reason, we assume that we
already have a certain level of permission within our
infrastructure. This is why all targeted user attacks for
initial access to the infrastructure are not particularly
interesting. Second, we do not take into account attacks
on the exploit of the infrastructure for lateral goals, since,
although important, they are not the main cases of insider
threat that can be found.
3.1.1. Privacy Leakage All the issues described in
this section are a consequence of the kind of information
that the clearing/platooning system needs to share and
use. Examples of relevant categories of data and
meta-data include:
• vehicle movements details: origin, destination,
middle stops, average time, average speed, etc.
• details of shipped items: origin, destination,
weight, package category, etc.
• route planning and execution constraints: clearing
instructions applied to the current convoy, speed
limits, etc.
While needed to enable operators’ participation in
platoon formation, the same information can be used by
insiders together with external data sources to compose a
targeted picture of sensitive aspects regarding a victim.
The kinds of “retrievable” information are categorized in
the following, based on the insider’s target.
User Attacks A single user’s privacy exploit is an
attack that an insider can do in many ways. There are
various effective methods to retrieve information about an
individual driver even if it is not explicitly shared. If any
database contains pseudo-identifiers, for example, the
vehicle’s serial number, they can be exploited to obtain
the existing association between the vehicle id and the
driver. For example, Callegati et al. in [23] demonstrated
how to skim the various entries of a database, crossing
them with external data from Open Source and publicly
available OSINT tools and proceeding by exclusion to
find the corresponding driver.
The process is described in principle in [24], where
in a similar scenario of a data clearing system for urban
public transport it was possible to trace a specific user’s
real identity by performing this kind of correlations.
Knowing the precise movements and journeys of a
vehicle driver is not only a powerful weapon against
the vehicle driver’s personal privacy; this information
can be also used by competing companies to intercept
the rivals’ demand / supply patterns.
Business Policies Attacks For delivering companies,
a fundamental competitive advantage derives from the
methods and procedures with which they distribute the
transport vehicles along their shipping routes. Indeed, it
is shown [25, 26] that an efficient allocation of means of
transport and drivers can reduce costs and management
burdens. This information is strictly guarded by any
company.
However, as explained above, to feed the necessary
data into the clearing system, individual vehicle data
must be (possibly partially) shared to calculate the
correct redistribution of profits. In turn, illicit access
or leakages of these data allow attackers to trace the
distribution rules of the vehicles, as shown in [24], where
through sequential analysis with clustering data mining
algorithms the authors extracted the distribution of buses
of a transport company present in a clearing system.
Unfair competition Lastly, we consider another type
of sensitive information that an insider is able to retrieve.
If information on vehicle routes and items carried is not
properly anonymized, it is possible for insiders to cross
them together and with external sources to interpolate
financial details. Knowing which routes are the most
profitable, what prices and which kinds of contracts
companies offer on the same routes, makes it easy for
unfair competitors to size contracts and deals [24].
3.1.2. Destructive Attacks The second category of
attacks that an insider can launch goes beyond accessing
an unauthorized resource and focuses on deriving
advantages from the disruption of competitor’s services.
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An insider can try to achieve this result by injecting
information in the clearing / platooning system. Carefully
crafted malicious information may be the cause of a
breakdown of competing services and businesses.
Routing corruption Let us consider a federated
platooning system that holds all the data of the trucks and
the shipped items of its members—as mentioned above,
needed to calculate the correct redistribution of the profits
and the management of platooning tasks. An insider
might, in this case, inject malicious information aimed
at excluding a specific route, causing denial-of-service
targeted at one or more vehicle of a specific company.
This exclusion can be achieved in several ways:
• declaring as additional meta-data fake speed limits
to make the vehicle (think of time-guaranteed
delivery trucks) late or to make a route plan
inaccurately (in)convenient;
• posting false or incorrectly located traffic updates
to force the competitor to change direction and
redirect it to a wrong and / or inconvenient path;
• inserting non-existent routes that will force the
vehicle to backtrack and recalculate along the way.
Competition starving The previous attack describes a
targeted denial-of-service scenario, in which an insider
attempts to block a competitor’s specific service. The
insider might wish, and be able, to do something more
subtle. Instead of making a brutal intervention that causes
a detectable disruption of a trip, the attacker could make
a campaign of small, well-distributed manipulations that
slowly impoverish the adversary economically. Such
insertions, if successful, have the peculiarity that they
cannot be immediately discovered, emerging only after
a thorough and time-consuming analysis of the dataset.
This kind of attack can be executed in several ways, for
example:
• by performing the same kind of injections as
described in the previous scenario, but introducing
an error so small as to make it unlikely to be
noticed as such, yet causing losses that end up
having a disruptive cumulative effect;
• by making actual orders that force the competitor
to deploy more vehicles (e.g., from a truck fleet)
with lower profit margins, and possibly leveraging
their presence to save more fuel from platooning.
4. Novel approaches to mitigation
The scientific literature provides various general
techniques to mitigate the insider threats described in the
previous section; these are summarized, as a reference,
in § 6. In this section, we propose two layered technical
solutions to tackle the data management issues outlined
in the previous section. These two approaches stem from
the observation that, from the point of view of data flow, it
is not strictly necessary to have a centralized architecture
to enable an effective exchange of information. On the
other hand, information systems that support federation
can be exploited to enforce correct behaviors of its
members.
In the following, we first detail a decentralized
overlay network for data safety and trustworthiness, then
we describe the features of a dynamic federation platform,
needed to monitor and interrupt deviant behaviors of
federated members.
4.1. Overlay Network
A possible alternative to centralized data dispatching
is to implement an overlay network created by the same
entities of the federation. In this section we propose
a solution based on a gossip protocol [27, 28], with
the intent of mitigating the risk of sensitive information
theft (eliminating the need of a centralized controller),
and the risk of malicious data injection (implementing
a trustworthiness source system that can guarantee the
provenance of data).
Before describing the details of our proposed
architecture, we provide a brief account on gossip-based
networks, whose principles are at the basis of our
overlay network. Gossip communication is a style of
computer-to-computer communication protocol inspired
by the form of gossip seen in social networks. Modern,
large-scale distributed systems often use gossip protocols
to solve problems that might be difficult to solve in
other ways [29], e.g., because the underlying network
either has an inconvenient structure or is extremely
large. Computer systems typically implement this type
of protocol with a form of random “peer selection”: with
a given frequency, each machine picks another machine
at random and shares any hot rumors.
In our gossip protocol, users choose to gossip
some information anonymously to a local administrators.
Although anonymous, gossips are signed by a ranking
grade owned by each user. In turn, local administrators
aggregate (in a weighted manner) the gossips they
received regarding the same objects (roads, point of
interest, etc.) and re-gossip that information to users.
By aggregating data (received within a certain time
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Figure 2. Phases of the Gossip Network.
span), administrators mitigate the diffusion of false
information in the network, mediating (or ruling out)
contrasting information. In our gossip protocol, nodes
disseminate knowledge of their surroundings — e.g.,
a user is on a route and notifies the status of that
road. Moving nodes periodically probe the network to
join the partition to which they geographically belong,
following a background dissemination approach. This
recalls anti-entropy approaches that focus on providing
a system-wide consistent observation as aggregate of
many local responses. Thanks to the gossip protocol,
we also anonymize the identity of users that query for
information. In a traditional network, users would query
a central server to retrieve some information, exposing
their query (and themselves, by extension) to possible
privacy attacks. On the contrary, in our setting it is
the gossip protocol that is responsible for spreading
information that might become relevant in the future
to users. Hence we accept a trade-off of some overhead
information to gain a privacy-by-design guarantee.
The concepts above are exemplified in Figure 2.
From left to right, when users want to join for the
first time or move between zones, they query known
gateways to obtain the address of the administrator of
the geographical region to which they currently belong.
Administrators act as local zone authorities to route
information about the same zone, and they can also
provide (as gossip) their trustworthy data to users. In
the gossip phase, users disseminate to administrators
information regarding their surroundings. In Figure 2,
U1 and U3 declare to know something about the route
A congestion (e.g., rough road, slow traffic), while U4
has some information about a specific incident on Route
B (e.g., closed roadways). The remaining phase regards
the inquiry of available data. Users periodically receive
aggregate (and possibly enriched) gossips from the local
administrator and query the knowledge they acquired
through gossiping to extract relevant information.
Figure 3 shows the two planes, over the physical one,
that characterize the proposed overlay network. From the
physical plane, users join the middle Neighborhood plane
where they generate new gossip (in the Figure, the thicker
the arrow, the more trustable the peer). On top, we find
the Inquiry plane, where gossip spreads and where users
inquiry their acquired knowledge.
A real world use case application for this overlay
network can be a rough-road check. A service
that exposes the real-time information about the road
conditions is typically based on an algorithm that
calculates an estimate, considering some previous
information and the GPS position of the vehicle. This
information is then saved on a centralized storage where
the delay is calculated. As described above, however,
this methodology introduces security problems on the
storage of data and quality of service, entailed by relying
exclusively on the users GPS location, which could
possibly be inaccurate. With the proposed approach,
we show how it is possible to improve the safety and
performance of this type of service.
In Figure 3, U1 (Inquiry Plane) has been informed
of the condition of the route it is currently following,
so it could decide to perform a route deviation. This
happened because it joined its local Neighborhood
network, where other users (the blue and yellow cars that
are further ahead on the route) have been gossiping 1©
(Neighborhood Plane) about its same route. In its turn,
the administrator collected the gossips, aggregated them,
and re-gossiped the information to the users 2©.
Although users U2 and U3 remain anonymous, U1
can rate the quality of the aggregated information; a
metric that can feed the system to assign the degree
of trustability to users, as specified in the previous
paragraph2. Besides security, the system enjoys a finer
grade of precision on the reporting of the information
as the machine-generated data from the administrator
is integrated with user-generated, close-to-the-source
information.
2Assignment of rankings to users can be spread back through gossip.
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4.2. Automatic Business Policies and
Contracts Enforcement
In § 3 we detailed how the platooning federation
relies on the collaboration between operators, and how
this gives the opportunity to malicious agents to adopt
damaging behaviors. To prevent this, we want to
introduce a mechanism to enforce the respect of the
agreed behavior in the federation.
This is a common problem in all kinds of Service
Oriented Architectures (SOA), as explicitly addressed
in OASIS’s SOA Reference Model [30]. According to
OASIS definitions, policies define constraints for single
services, and our approach is to let each provider and
each consumer of services deal with data-related policies
without forcing a centralization which could become
the most valuable target for attacks. Contracts, on the
other hand, “represent an agreement between two or
more participants [...] a service contract is a measurable
assertion that governs the requirements and expectations
of two or more parties. Unlike policy enforcement,
which is usually the responsibility of the policy owner,
contract enforcement may involve resolving disputes
between the parties to the contract. The resolution of
such disputes may involve appeals to higher authorities.
Like policies, contracts may be expressed in a form that
permits automated interpretation.”
Our proposal is to let that higher authority be
represented by the platform enabling the federation.
Rather than merely acting as an enabler, the information
system supporting the federation shall connect each
member based on the behavior that each operator
declared and agreed to respect to join the federation. The
support encompasses automated checking of contracts
for compliance to general principles at design and deploy
time, and the enforcement of contract provisions at run
time. It is a part of a more comprehensive strategy for
SOA management, as oulined in [31].
This shift moves federation from a static coalition
of companies into a federated market, where operators
dynamically partner with each other and trade and use
services of one another on-demand, knowing that the
agreed terms of usage will be respected. As remarked,
this last guarantee is enforced by the platform itself,
which will monitor the flow of requests and responses
among the members, detect possible behaviors that
deviate from the declared policy and limit or block the
cooperation with an offending member.
In practice, contract specification is done when the
platoon operator wants to join a federation. In this sense,
enabling platforms shall provide respectively:
• a formal model with which to interpret policies
and contracts;
• a set of specific requirements to satisfy in order to
guarantee a safe environment;
• a set of policies regarding the use and the misuse
of the services exposed;
In this context, business policies can have different
purposes. For example, they can establish rules to
mechanize the trading of the services of federated
members, as well as to establish standards used in their
interaction, like security and communication protocols,
and define the terms of the quality of service. Automated
policy processing allows automated contract design, to
enable dynamic participation to the federation activities.
In turn, contract enforcement at run time ensures all
parties that everyone is held accountable against the
designed contracts.
Beside security, we underline how these business policies
are particularly important in the context of platooning
operators, where each of them controls a specific,
restricted area, while the platooning plan of a convoy
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usually spans areas controlled by many operators. With
automatized business policies platooning operators can
collaborate in synthesizing a common platooning plan,
possibly comprising a mixed set of their users.
A prototypical example of one such platform is [32],
where the authors employ machine-processable business
policies to federate remote instances in a federated
platform and where transport operators that agree to the
same (or better, to compatible) business policies can
partner with each other and trade each other’s transport
services.
5. Related Work
To the best of our knowledge there are no works
that consider and analyze insider threats in the context
of federated platooning. However, there are some
works close to ours, which consider security threats on
traditional platooning, showcasing some vertical attacks.
One example is the work of Dadras et al. [33] where they
showed how through appropriate vehicle movements they
were able to destabilize the vehicular platooning causing
severe accidents. A similar attack analysis has been
made in [34], where the authors went on to propose a
safety-security co-design engineering process to derive
functional security requirements.
Boeira et al. [35] proposed a study on a collaborative
platooning approach. There, the authors evaluated
several attack scenarios, similar to some of those we
analyzed, identifying how platoons behave under varying
attack conditions and what are the associated safety risks.
For what concerns the mitigations of such kind of
attacks, literature abounds. The threats introduced by
this federations of platform can be seen as an extensions
of privacy and confidentiality issues of data management
in XaaS platforms (Everything-as-a-service). For this
reason, complementary to the two layered solutions
proposed there are a set of data management solutions
that, adapted to our specific context, can implement a
secure, verifiable and safe platooning system.
To counteract pattern extraction attacks against
privacy, it is possible to deploy sanitization
techniques [36, 37, 38, 39]. These techniques
must balance two needs: masking sensitive data
versus keeping enough utility, i.e. information needed
to perform the economic evaluations [40]. All the
countermeasures for this kind of attacks are based on a
trade-off between the amount of sensitive data preserved
and utility of the queries.
Different anonymization and sanitization techniques
have been proposed for complex datasets, but we need to
introduce a measure that indicates the maximum amount
of anonymized information such that the queries still
work.
Different works proposed metrics for the evaluation
of the amount of privacy preserved in specific dataset. A
measure introduced in [41] defined an evaluation metric
about the presence of pattern in a dataset called delta-
presence. We can use this metric to evaluate the presence
of a specific patterns in the shared dataset. Another
interesting work in this direction is [36, 42] which
operates by complementing existing techniques with post
randomization methods.
Platforms for the automatic federation of members
are suitable to integrate modules with functionalities like:
• sensitive data leakage prevention through masking
of the raw datasets that reside in the centralized
clearing system database;
• run-time, on line compliance checking of evolutive
process changes by means of differential privacy
protection evaluations;
• detection of privacy breaches by search of sensitive
data on external data sources.
Injection of malicious data aimed at causing a
denial-of-service is a difficult threat to mitigate. The
main problem is that an injection prevention system must
react on real-time to a specific attack, deciding if an event
of data submission is legitimate or not.
Such Prevention Systems and more generally
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) work on the analysis
of malicious models. The difference with our scenario is
that a model can not be necessarily malicious (meaning
as different from the regular ones). For this reason,
the IPS of a clearing system should be applied to the
analysis of the values, by detecting the range of suspects
that will be eventually set under more in-depth analysis.
Similar work has been done in real-time traffic control
system [43] where data where buffered in specific amount
and analyzed in such a way as to intercept a malicious
value with a good trade-off between false positives and
negatives. These attacks introduce real and legitimate
values, but with a small error in real time that, spread on
numerous injections, can lead to a considerable economic
loss.
A longterm and deep analysis is required to detect
these attacks, and once the attack is discovered, the
attacker must be blocked. To do this it is therefore
very useful to implement a rating mechanism for each
individual user of the system. The inclusion of an
error can be, in small quantities, completely legitimate.
However, it is necessary to keep track of cumulated
contributions and of the subsequent errors. For this
reason a rating system that produces detailed feedback
on the quality, quantity, and rating of data entered by
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a particular user can block attackers in advance. An
interesting rating mechanism has been described in [44]
where the system classified feedbacks based on the user’s
role within the system, and by evaluating the quality
of the data on a configurable set of options. Finally
another interesting related work came from Laurendeau
and Barbeau [45] where authors proposed a seminal
work on the identification, ranking, and mitigations of
security threats in WAVE, an architecture for vehicular
networks used in platooning scenarios. Among the
main threats from insider identified in [45] are denial
of service/spamming attacks, data tampering, false
data/malware injections, information eavesdropping, and
identity masking/theft.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we investigated and proposed
mitigations to insider threats concerning federated
platooning, i.e., a freight organization system where
a consortium of platooning operators collaborate and
coordinate their users to constitute freights. From our
threat analysis, we detailed novel technical solutions to
the predominant threats of trustworthiness of data flows
and deviant behaviors of federation members.
There are a few aspects that are worth a
deeper investigation, mainly related to the practical
implementation of the system; we thank the anonymous
reviewers for helping us focus these limitations. Gossip
protocols have been studied for more than a decade [46]
and proved their effectiveness in many scenarios similar
to ours, yet we need to quantify implementation costs and
actual information dissemination robustness. Rating the
trustworthiness of provided information is another aspect
that received significant attention (see for example [47]
and the cited related works). In our scenario, the positive
results achieved by different means in other contexts
could be hindered by the restricted number of members
in each community; a detailed analysis is needed.
As future work, we plan to test and quantify
the effectiveness of our solutions by simulating a
series of prototypical platooning operators and conduct
extensive tests, to assess the ability of the platform
of identifying erroneous information and isolating
misbehaving members, as well as to estimate the
robustness of the platoon formation schemes to external
disruptions.
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